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Abstract — In the last years, governmental bodies have been 
futilely trying to fight against dark web marketplaces. Shortly 
after the closing of “The Silk Road” by the FBI and Europol in 
2013, new successors have been established. Through the 
combination of cryptocurrencies and nonstandard communication 
protocols and tools, agents can anonymously trade in a 
marketplace for illegal items without leaving any record.  This 
paper presents a research carried out to gain insights on the 
products and services sold within one of the larger marketplaces 
for drugs, fake ids and weapons on the Internet, Agora. Our work 
sheds a light on the nature of the market; there is a clear 
preponderance of drugs, which accounts for nearly 80% of the 
total items on sale.  The ready availability of counterfeit 
documents, while they make up for a much smaller percentage of 
the market, raises worries. Finally, the role of organized crime 
within Agora is discussed and presented.  
Keywords—etl processing, data wrangling, authomation, 
dark web, security, tor, bitcoins 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In the current era of the internet of things, a Dark Web has been 
developing under the surface.  
The Dark Web usually relies on the combination of crypto 
currencies such as bitcoins and anonymized access as the 
foundations in creating a market place for dealing illegal drugs, 
weapons and other illegal contrabands. 
In recent years, the Dark Web has been in extreme scrutiny and 
investigations from legal authorities around the globe.  
The clamp down of these have come with mixed success. 
Whilst many of these websites have been successfully shut 
down; others resurface or re-migrate soon after. The most 
significant case is the Silk Road, which was shut down in 
October 2013 and then resurface as Silk Road 2.0 in a month 
later. Then, soon after the shut down of Silk Road 2.0 in 2014, 
many of the vendors just simple migrate to other marketplaces 
such as Evolution and Agora.  
Although a number of prominent web sites in the Dark Web 
have been shut down thanks to intervention from police forces, 
the main characteristics of these Dark Web sites are still 
unknown and we didn't know enough of how these websites 
operate.  
The term Dark Web was first introduced in the year 2000s and 
has been in use both in the media and in academia since then.  
Most research done are focusing in identifying extremist 
views and identifying extremist groups. Only recently there 
interest has started to surge in others areas, including drug 
trafficking [1], looking at alias classification and authorship 
attribution.  
In this paper the focus will be on the analysis of the Dark Web 
marketplaces as a phenomenon and on an in-depth analysis of 
Agora, a marketplace for drugs, counterfeit documents and ids 
that we monitored for our research.  
The structure of this paper is as follows: sections 2 describes 
the context of our research and the related work. Then, in 
section 3, we present a detailed descriptions about the data 
collection procedures and the experiment setup. The 
experimental results are discussed in section 4. Finally, 
conclusions are presented about the research.  
 
II. UNDER THE SURFACE: DEEP WEB AND DARK WEB 
Research on the “size” of the Internet shows that its size (in 
term of hosts) has reached 1.05 billion hosts in early 2016 
(http://ftp.isc.org/www/survey/reports/current/); about 3.5 
billion users have now access to the Internet.   
Due to the constant growth of the contents available and users, 
a specific family of service providers has arisen in order to try 
to index the information and allow users to reach the content 
within the internet through these search engines [2].  
This collection of resources indexed by search engines and 
made publicly available falls under the category of “surface 
web”. However, regardless of the effort done by these search 
engines in order to index more content and in the most useful 
way to the final user, some of the contents available on the 
internet are yet not indexed.  
On the top layer of the web, we have the indexed, surface web 
in which we navigate daily. Under the surface web, we have the 
deep web, content underneath the surface and not indexed by 
the search engines. Bergman [3] estimated the deep web to be 
400 to 550 times larger than the content on the surface.  
Under the deep web, we can find the dark web, the back alley 
of the Internet [4]. While “deep web” and “dark web” are 
sometimes used interchangeably (especially by the media, but 
also by other authors), will use the above distinction for this 
paper.  
 
A. Dark web 
We can define the Dark Web as "a collection of websites that 
are publicly visible, but hide the IP addresses of the 
servers that run them" [5]. These web sites can be visited 
by users, but it is hard to identify where they are hosted 
and who hosts them, as they are hidden behind encryption 
protocols – typically either Tor (The Onion Routing) or 
I2P (Invisible Internet Project). 
While the expression "dark web" as we intend it today is 
relatively recent, the concepts around dark web have been 
under investigation since the early 2000s.   
The concept for example comes up in several works by 
Chen, H. et el. around a "Terrorist Knowledge Portal" 
(cited in [6]; the papers are not indexed, but the slides for 
a presentation are available [7]), linking it to "the use of 
the Internet by terrorist and extremist groups".  
B. Timeline of the Dark Web marketplaces 
It was through a forum post 
(https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=3984.msg57080 ) on 
March 2011 that the first large dark web hosted market place 
was publicly announced. The Silk Road was presented as an 
anonymous online market, still under development in hope to 
receive feedback from the bitcoin community. 
While starting with drugs, the staff was aiming to offer weapons 
and other products that may be difficult to find on the surface 
web market places.  
With the combined efforts of FBI and Interpol, the site was 
seized on February 2013, ending with the arrest of Ross 
William Ulbricht, who was charged with engaging in a money 
laundering and narcotics trafficking conspiracy as well as 
computer hacking [8]. 
Other dark web sites started to fill the market niche left by The 
Silk Road. Some of these include “Evolution”, “Hydra” and the 
“Silk Road 2.0". However, combined efforts of Europol and 
FBI would seize the vast majority of them during “operation 
Onymous” on November 2014 [9]. 
Yet some of this platforms remained after operation Onymous: 
“Evolution” and “Agora”. However, a few months later, 
Evolution was allegedly subject of an inside scam where 
130.000 Bitcoins were allegedly stolen, following by the 
closure of their services 
(https://www.reddit.com/r/DarkNetMarkets/comments/2zeuxo
/complaintwarning_evolution_admins_exit_scamming/).  
With no competition left, Agora became the “king of the Dark 
Net” [10]. Agora has changed host and domain name several 
times in an attempt to avoid cyber-crime law enforcers over its 
almost two years of existence. agorahooawayyfoe.onion, one of 
the instances of this marketplace is the subject of this study. 
As of today, the site has been shut down by their staff since 
September 2015, with the motivation cited as a number of 
vulnerabilities exposed regarding the anonymization process of 
the TOR network 
(https://www.reddit.com/r/AgMarketplace/comments/3idznd/a
gora_to_pause_operations/ ). 
C. Agora 
Agora is (or possibly was) a popular “dark web” marketplace. 
Agora does have characteristics that are similar to other black 
market operations [11] and it’s based on behaviour that doesn’t 
comply with an organisational set of rules.  
It is fairly obvious that entities that fail to comply with the set 
of rules do so in order to obtain some sort of benefit. 
Generally speaking, Agora was selling both products and 
services, with a minimal set of rules. At the time of our research 
the only items that couldn’t be sold were body parts, and the 
only service that was forbidden to sell was assassination. 
It is possible that the very limited set of rules might have been 
some sort of market positioning statement - in practice the key 
areas of business within the market where drugs, fake ids and 
weapons (but only for a limited time). 
As for all black market operations, operations on Agora were 
not taxed, neither directly nor indirectly, and Agora offered 
sellers the possibility for sellers to place products that could not 
be typically sold legally.  
The key aspects of Agora are largely similar to the ones of other 
illegal operations: protection of the identity for the members, 
exchange of money, illicit profits. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT 
A. Architecture  
The first proof-of-concept for our spider was developed with a 
few lines of code to simulate a human authentication on the 
market.  
The on-line marketplace was first of all invite-only - so access 
to the market place required some digging for an invite and 
several sessions on the web site were required to be able to 
replicate human-like sessions to proceed with the data 
collection. 
The application used for collection has been built on a classic 
LAMP stack for data collection – and a variety of languages for 
data analysis. 
The miner was developed using command line PHP (and the 
cURL library) and an object oriented approach, using MySQL 
as a backend. 
The analysis of the data has been carried with several tools - 
including Weka and ad-hoc Java and Python scripts. 
Libraries such as Pandas, Numpy, NLTK and MatPlotLib have 
been used for the analysis, integrated within a Jupyter notebook, 
enabling the team to explore and interact with the code and 
results of the analysis.  
Both the MySQL database and the Jupyter notebook are being 
hosted using a popular cloud hosting service allowing the team 
to collaborate remotely in real time.  
Finally, in order to promote a homogeneous development 
environment between all members of the team and the hosted 
service, we have integrated all our software dependencies on a 
Docker container running Ubuntu Linux with an installation of 
Jupyter. 
All the code for both the data collection spider and the data 
analysis tools can be found in Github, respectively 
at https://github.com/zaharovs/collector 
and https://github.com/mauromsl/dark_web_datamining  
 
B. Data Collection 
Navigation on Agora is anonymous as Agora is hosted on the 
Tor network; from our analysis, Agora also used a combination 
of classic discretionary access control techniques for 
authentication [12], combined with techniques to discourage 
web scraping.  
Protection of their business model in general, and specifically 
assets is something that Agora's team very much considered, 
but the techniques used by the team were neither advanced nor 
seemed to show awareness of the developments of the last few 
years. 
There is extensive research on techniques to discourage web 
scraping; the most common ones include: 
1. Turing tests 
2. User-agent identification 
3. Throttling of HTTPD requests 
4. Obfuscation 
5. Data tainting  
6. Injecting markers 
7. Network traffic analysis 
Within the Agora team, there was clear effort in trying to 
minimize the impact of deep web extraction. Turing tests and 
user-agent identification were implemented at the time we 
started our work, and network traffic analysis was most likely 
introduced later on while we were working on the data 
collection.  
Turing tests to differentiate real users from software robots are 
common in the industry [13], and Agora did use optical 
character recognition CAPTCHAS. This was the single 
protection that slowed the most our spider; while the spider was 
running largely automatically, the CAPTCHA challenge was 
answered manually (and had to be repeated several times per 
day due as sessions had limited persistence). 
Agora also implemented some sort of user-agent identification 
techniques, but they were fairly basic (user agent header and 
referrer) and did not implement more advanced HTTP header 
sniffing (e.g. looking for headers that a normal browser would 
send, as Accept-Encoding, but that a spider may not send). 
Agora didn't implement either more advanced techniques as 
obfuscation (e.g. generation of text with JavaScript), data 
tainting [14] or even account audits, which overall facilitated 
our spidering. 
Injecting markers is normally used to identify intellectual 
property that is taken and re-published; given the business 
operation that Agora was running it is unlikely that it was too 
relevant. 
Routine site maintenance and self imposed throttling (we were 
trying to avoid detection) did mean that our spidering was not 
as fast as we would have liked – and we managed to have only 
a limited number of data collection points. 
In time, the web site administrators might have realized that 
data mining was in progress as extra layers of protection were 
added: geolocation, session expiration and session management 
were added after we started the monitoring and before the 
closure.  
The rationale for session expiration and session management 
checks is self-evident: sessions were frequently expired 
automatically, which meant having to restart the Tor 
connection, re-authenticate and deal again with the Turing test. 
When it comes to geolocation checks (and bans) we can just 
hypothesize that Agora was trying to block TOR connections 
from exit points where traffic level was too high. This was 
countered again by restarting the Tor connection. 
Towards the end of our data collection, the site was typically 
unavailable every day for hours, which again required changes 
in the code and in the way we were collecting data.  
That said, Agora’s network traffic analysis was fairly weak; 
Agora was an invite only web site, and invites were not easy to 
find. Two accounts only were used to mine the data and no 
particular actions have been attempted to audit (and/or block) 
user connections.  
The main data collected was the list of products (including both 
product description and images) and vendors in Agora.  
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. Overview 
A total of 30.680 records were collected during our study, 
starting from 22nd July 2015 until 3rd September 2015. 
When looking at the supply side of the market, most of the 
products categories are drugs such as cocaine, MDMA or 
heroin. The “other” category seems to be the largest of them in 
terms of number of listings (this doesn’t mean it is 
in terms of value). 
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Figure 3 Geographical distribution 
??????????????? ?????????????? ????????????????????????? ????
?????? ????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ??? ?????
???????? ????? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ???? ??????????? ???? ?????? ???
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?
Figure 4 Geographical distribution for drugs 
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Table 1 Top 10 countries by market size 
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Table 2 Top 10 sellers, sorted by value of products on sale  
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Figure 5 Top 10 counterfeit document vendors, sorted by market 
size  
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Figure 6 Top 25 vendors by market value?
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concentration of the value within a small vendors is a factor that 
points us to the fact that the agents behind these markets are not 
small independent vendors but rather larger criminal 
organizations. In regards to the counterfeit passports and 
national ids market, the dominance is not as wide as in the drugs 
market but still a respectable 40% of the market.  
It’s worth nothing also that in some cases the quantity of 
merchandise on sale on one individual transaction was such that 
would suggest the presence of organized crime. When looking 
at the hashish category, for example, the mean amount on sale 
is 47g, with a median of 10g, but with some sellers selling up 
to 1 kg at the time.  
Finally, our research indicates that there was some use of 
sockpuppets – identities used for deception – within Agora. We 
decided to try to identify sockpuppets by looking at vendors 
consistently using exactly the same images for their products – 
on the grounds that vendors using the same images were likely 
to be connected.  
The analaysis did show a number of sockpuppets – but the 
amount was fairly limited – with no more than 2 sockpuppets 
per vendor. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
When we started this work, we wanted to try to lift the curtain 
on dark web markets. We didn’t have any idea of its nature, of 
its size, of the role that organized crime seems to be playing 
within the market. 
There are serious issues that emerge from our research.  
Over 170691.12 BitCoins (about £26 million) of merchandise 
where on sale on the period under examination. Over 30,000 
products were on sale; 1233 sellers participated in the market, 
spread across 20 countries, with the largest number located in 
the US and UK. 
Drugs, ids and also weapons were readily available in a trans-
national marketplace, just one click away and anonymously. 
When it comes to counterfeit documents, it is relevant to 
mention that any EU ID card would allow the potential buyer 
to travel through any country in the EU, open bank accounts 
and in general create a new identity for himself/herself.  
While we didn’t manage to collect any data on weapons as they 
were removed from the market early on, it was originally 
possible to buy also weapons – and to have them delivered 
through multiple packages, disassembled. 
Black market services are working very cautiously, 
implementing security measures and hacker avoidance updates 
regularly. They are largely dominated by organized crime, and 
they keep resurfacing regardless of the efforts made to shut 
them down. 
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